The Operational Excellence Tools Series | #61: 6 Ships, 8 Days, 1 Dead. Hormuz Enters Its Deadliest Week.

Welcome to the unique weekend article for the Loyal Fan subscribers-only edition.

This is the #61 article of The Operational Excellence Tools Series.

Outlines and Key Takeaways

Part 1 – Official Announcement

Part 2 – Background and Meaning

Part 3 – Analysis Through the Lens of Operational Excellence

Part 4 – Lessons for Businesses

Part 5 – Conclusion

PART 1: OFFICIAL INFORMATION

At 3 a.m. on July 7, 2026, local time in the Gulf region, a projectile struck the upper engine room of the LNG carrier Al Rekayyat as the vessel transited the Strait of Hormuz along the NCAGS (Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping) corridor coordinated by the U.S. Navy. Al Rekayyat is owned and operated by Nakilat (full name: Qatar Gas Transport Company, ticker QGTS on the Qatar Exchange), one of the world’s largest LNG fleets with over 60 active liquefied natural gas carriers. The vessel flies the Marshall Islands flag and was carrying a full load of liquefied natural gas on its voyage from the port of Ras Laffan (Qatar) through the Strait of Hormuz toward the Indian Ocean. The projectile ignited an engine room fire immediately, and the crew was forced to evacuate entirely due to the extremely high risk of explosion from the flammable LNG cargo on board. Specialized maritime news outlet gCaptain reported the vessel was in a state of being “at risk of exploding” due to its extremely flammable LNG cargo. A fully loaded LNG carrier contains energy equivalent to tens of thousands of tonnes of TNT, meaning that if it exploded in the middle of a strait only 33 km wide, the consequences would be catastrophic not only for the crew but for all maritime traffic in the area. Qatar subsequently issued an official statement, affirming it would “hold Iran fully legally responsible” for the attack and “all resulting damages and consequences.” This was the first time a leading LNG-exporting nation publicly attributed direct responsibility to Iran for attacking one of its cargo vessels.

That same night, the supertanker Wedyan flying the Saudi Arabian flag, classified as a VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier, an ultra-large crude oil carrier with deadweight tonnage exceeding 200,000 DWT), was also struck while exiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian state television declared the tanker was targeted because it “attempted to transit the Omani route in the Strait of Hormuz with U.S. Navy assistance” and “had ignored multiple warnings” from the IRGC naval forces. This statement revealed that the IRGC considered any vessel following the U.S.-coordinated NCAGS corridor a legitimate target, regardless of nationality or cargo type. Less than 24 hours later, a third vessel was attacked. Three commercial ships shot in a single night at the same strait. This was the most violent wave of attacks since the preliminary ceasefire agreement was signed between the United States and Iran on June 17 (Memorandum of Understanding, abbreviated MoU), just three weeks earlier. The MoU, which the shipping industry had expected would de-escalate the situation at Hormuz, became a worthless piece of paper in just 20 days.

Four days later, on July 11, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced it had launched a third round of airstrikes targeting Iranian military positions along the southern coast, in response to the attacks on commercial vessels. Targets included anti-ship missile batteries, fast-attack boat bases, and IRGC coastal radar systems. But the American retaliation did not prevent the next escalation. On July 12, the IRGC Navy (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran) declared the Strait of Hormuz “closed” to all commercial vessels, while simultaneously attacking the container vessel M/V GFS Galaxy flying the Cyprus flag. GFS Galaxy was a medium-sized container ship with 24 crew members on board. A projectile ignited an engine room fire, forcing all crew to abandon ship in the darkness in the middle of the strait. Ten Indian seafarers were rescued from lifeboats by the Omani Navy in a search-and-rescue operation lasting several hours, but one was missing: Heramb Karmarkar, 30 years old, a marine engineer, was not among those rescued. His family in Maharashtra, India, received word that their son was missing at sea. Iran claimed the attack was justified because the vessel “followed an unauthorized route despite warnings.”

CENTCOM responded with a fourth round of airstrikes against Iran. On July 13, Iran claimed it had struck 2 more oil tankers attempting to transit. Then on July 14, the escalation peaked: the IRGC attacked 3 tankers in a single morning. The chemical tanker Stolt Magnesium, owned by Stolt-Nielsen (Norway), one of the world’s largest chemical tanker operators, was struck at 00:40 at a position 40 nautical miles northeast of the town of Qalhat on the Omani coast, outside the Strait of Hormuz. The projectile caused an engine room fire but the crew remained safe. Two UAE-owned tankers (United Arab Emirates), Mombasa B and Al Bahyah, were attacked with cruise missiles inside the strait itself. This was the first time during the crisis that the IRGC used cruise missiles instead of artillery shells or short-range anti-ship missiles, indicating a significant escalation in weaponry. On Mombasa B, 1 Indian seafarer was killed and 8 were injured (6 Indians, 2 Ukrainians). The IRGC claimed to have “hit and neutralized supertankers in violation” that were entering “mined waterways.” Also on July 14, after two days of searching, the body of Heramb Karmarkar was recovered by the Omani Navy from waters near the position where the GFS Galaxy was attacked. India’s BusinessToday ran a headline that sent shockwaves: “Second Indian seafarer killed in three days.”

That same day, July 14, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social declaring the United States would become “THE GUARDIAN OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT” and impose a 20% toll on all cargo transiting the strait, framing it as a “protection fee” for U.S.-provided maritime security. The International Maritime Organization (IMO, headquartered in London) immediately declared the proposal illegal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), as the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait with freedom of transit passage for all commercial vessels. The global shipping industry pushed back fiercely. Within 24 hours (July 15), Trump withdrew the 20% toll proposal, replacing it with investment commitments from Gulf nations including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. On July 15, the U.S. launched another major round of airstrikes targeting Iran’s southern coast and IRGC military positions near the strait, while the IRGC claimed it had conducted retaliatory strikes against U.S. military facilities across the Gulf region. In total over 8 days (July 7 to 15): at least 9 commercial vessels directly attacked, 2 seafarers killed, 8 wounded, multiple rounds of airstrikes exchanged between the U.S. and Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz officially became an active combat zone on all international maritime charts, rather than merely a high-risk area as it had been during the preceding 4 months since February 28.